Force Multipliers In Counter Terrorism

VIEWS (5436)

Operations Behind Enemy Line

Brig N A Dharmaratne RWP RSP psc

Elite forces are represented by the finest fighting outfits of the Sri Lanka Army and is organise d into two regiments; Commandos and Special Forces. The special operations forces, operated from the sharp end of the strategy through to the operational level and also at tactical levels executing a multitude of defences spearheading the campaign. Striking the terrorist leadership in the depth LTTE controlled areas, destroying and disrupting the LTTEs indirect weapons system in the mid battle space and also their reserves and at times counter - attacking to restore the critical defences are some of the actions taken by the special forces . The elites made a seamless contribution to the overall success of this campaign, which is unparallel in the history of counter-insurgency.

The Commandos were initiated in 1980 as a direct fraction in counter-terror force whereas the special forces were raised five years later in 1985 to conduct unconventional warfare and operations in rural, remote and urban environments. However, due to the nature of the conflict and their employment over the years both forces became highly effective and versatile in the conduct of counter-guerilla and counter-insurgent warfare in rural, jungle and urban environments. Their skills have diversified over the years and their capabilities in long range patrolling ant hijack and hostage rescue operations, water borne and heli borne operations, combat riding, sniping and demolition were acquired, developed, mastered and finally applied successfully into combat.

A completely different operational strategy was adapted by the Army in the East as against the strategy in the North. The elite force was employed to spearhead thrusts of infantry units directed towards the LTTE. A factor that influenced in designing such a concept were the dispersed enemy positions, and the thick forest with overhead canopies that is commonly found in the East. At the operations designed to fight the LTTE; elite forces spanned out in small teams ahead of infantry battalion gathering information and eroding LTTE combat power. Through a series of well-coordinated attacks over an extended period thus pulling the battalions to the decisive points on the battlefield and this process was repeated in stages. Applying this design the military operations in the Eastern theatre were conducted in two phases. The operations conducted in separate phases and in phase one Special Forces supported by some infantry units captured the northern part of the theatre whereas in the second phase Commandos supported by some infantry units captured the remaining part of the LTTE held areas of the theatre. When the Humanitarian Operations were extended to the North the elite forces were employed to operate the entire width and depth of the Wanni opera tions theatre (northern operation theatre). The task for the Elite Forces ranged from long-range patrol, small group operations behind enemy lines, conventional operations to unconventional operations. Rescue operations to strike operations.

Long-range patrols conducted strategically important operations in to the enemy held territory, gaining targets for air strikes and artillery. Ambushing LTTE movements. Particularly their leaders and threatening their lines of communication. Meanwhile, the other Elite Forces operated up to about twenty kilometers ahead of the fighting infantry brigades and divisions in support of close operations. Thus, the Elite Forces denied freedom of movement of the LTTE in their arena. The advantages that came in the battlefield by successful operations of elite forces were well exploited by the infantry. While infantry formations closely engaged the LTTE, Elite Forces infiltrated through the LTTE positions to their rear in small tanks while carrying out concentrated attacks causing a severe damage to them. This forced the LTTE to thin out their cadres who were engaged with the advancing infantry. Culminating their defeat inevitably. The elite forces have proved their capability to destroy a considerable number of LTTE cadres in any given area prior to infantry reaching their objectives. It is also significant that towards the very end of the battle the elite forces having been employed to mop up the area they resorted to precision targeting and managed to eliminate almost all the remaining LTTE leadership.

The protection of plans of the infantry divisions was one of the main tasks that was entrusted to the elite force. As infantry formation advanced forward their flanks were extended because they liberated areas. Elite forces operated away from these flanks, denying LTTE cadres being a major threat to these flanks. A classic example of this is that 57 Division was leaning on to Killinochchi and the task force too had stretched its limit the Army had somewhat peculiar configuration with over 50 kilometer open flank which was very vulnerable. The effort to dominate these plans by the elite forces ensured that both divisions were able to capture their objectives without much interference from their flanks.

There were a number of instances where elite forces repulsed LTTE counter attacks and prevented LTTE regaining initiative. In one such instance just after 57 - 2 brigade captured their stronghold the advance was resumed and the LTTE launched a major counter-attack. Pushed the brigade about two kilometers south and threatened to penetrate even further which resulted in fierce fighting in the area. Immediately, two squads of special forces rushed to the area to repulse LTTE attacks and regain the control after two days of fierce fighting. In another instance during late January 2009 when the Army was poised to encircle the rest of the LTTE controlled areas with seven divisions fighting their way through, forces estimated that the LTTE would concentrate its force on one point on the defences of the Army and attempt to break into the jungle in order to escape to the South. They took count of this probability elite forces were strategically positioned behind infantry frontages. This contingency paid off three times in later stages as LTTE launched three fierce counter offensives to break into the jungle. Fiercest of all three was LTTE counter offensive south of Pudukuduirruppu where after 59 - three brigade had been completely defeated and pushed back about five kilometers by the LTTE. Special forces were launched into the area along with along with Commandos to hold the LTTE thrust and they fought back gallantly and regained the control.

There were some situations where the progress of the infantry advanced was impeded or literally halted by well-fortified LTTE strong points. As a last resort Elite forces were called to overcome these strong points. One such instance in west of Thampanai 57 two brigade struggled to overcome the LTTE strong point that fell along its access. Special forces raided this strongpoint killing a number of terrorists and capturing the area after which the brigade progressed unimpeded.

On September 29, 2008 the LTTE raided one of the Air Force bases in the rear of the theatre using their elites the Black Tigers. Two LTTE aircrafts bombed the base at the same time. Squadron of Special Forces were reinforced with the task of halting further exploitation of the LTTE attack. Special Forces team maneuvered into the area and successfully accomplished mission destroying the remaining terrorists and regaining control. There were instances where the elite forces concentrated their attacks or the operations in a particular area behind LTTE positions in order to isolate them thereby creating favourable conditions for infantry troops to capture to the areas. For example capturing of the LTTE stronghold in Madhu was made very much easier by Special Forces cutting off LTTE reinforcement as supplier lines directed or leading towards Madhu area.

In certain crucial stages the elite forces assisted infantry in leading their fighting columns to decisive locations in the battlefield. As an example throughout the Vittataltiv battle commandos operating ahead of infantry columns constantly engaged in the LTTE during day time and moved forward stealthily at night and occupied blocking positions. And on the next day the infantry moved up and linked up with the Commando blocks. This process was repeated until the capture of entire Vittataltiv area. An example of the Akkaraikulam battle Special Forces guided the infantry column in a night move up to the designated fold location paving way for the infantry force to capture that area.

Whenever, the operations reached the crucial or decisive points the elites had a major role to play. The Commandos and Special Forces who spearheaded the two infantry columns in the biggest ever rescue operation by rapturing any defenses from two different locations and opening up two breaking points. The art of long-range patrols is a stunning tactical part that can be regarded as the most dreadful operational pattern of Special Forces or the Special Operations. Such teams are the combination of multi-skilled individuals who are well trained and motivated to conduct deep operations. In small troops, independently, without resupply for a extended period up to about twenty days or more depending on cachet.

When the offensives began in the Northern theatre initially the troops were inducted from the Vavuniya, Mannar and Welioya areas. These were the furthest points from the LTTE headquarters and their main bases that are located in Killinochchi and Mullativu. The terrorists endured a greater freedom of movement within the area in between. Long-range patrols or 'LRPs' as they are commonly known executed long-term well-coordinated series of operations to deny this freedom to the LTTE. LRPs slowly but surely established their presence in cachets in the area and updated intelligence. Based on the intelligence they started attacks, delivering a devastating blow to the LTTE. They killed a number of top-level LTTE cadres. Thereby distanced the LTTE leaders from their front line fighting cadres, which was a major blow to the LTTE top leadership. Now to counter this threat forced by the LRPs the LTTE had to commit thousands of their cadres to guard their rear. LRPs depended mostly on their own intelligence to plan operations. Collection of information was done through tactical maneuvering in the LTTE controlled areas for days and months. Acquired information is then preserved in an intelligent cell and detailed continuation of study has been carried out prior to selection of targets rather than relying much on electronic means of information collection unless other than satellite images the clandestine ways of information collection was carried out by the LRPs and that was a tremendous success in the battlefield.

Due to the scarcity of water resources found in the operational area and also due to the inability of resupply by air the LRPs had to depend heavily on the cachets. Cachet operations, which preceded other LRP operations, gained constant continuity of operations deeply in the enemy held territory throughout the campaign. These cachets contained mainly the ration, ammunition, water and medicine. And our concept was to have cachets established at least in every ten square kilometres located for planned operations and for emergency situations. The ground itself was a surveillance post for the LRPs. Throughout the battle the highest possible battle skills moreover supported by mental robustness in soldiering had been the essence of collecting everything from the LTTE that could destroy them without disturbing the civilian habitat.

In most occasions LRRPs established surveillance forced well ahead of advancing infantry Division on most likely approaches of the LTTE and continued to provide valuable information to these divisions. LRP operations were deliberately planned to have the patrols spinning from one range of operations to another range of operations changing missions but not the modus operandi. It is a cycle of operations having constant circular affiliation with each other. One team, which confronts enemy, may instantly find a team on a surveillance mission replacing another team on a cachet mission. Hence the LRP missions were launched in such a tight timeframe that the patrols were available in such proximity to be able to help each other in case of an emergency.

The Sri Lanka Air Force operated closely and directly with the LRPs. A very good understanding between the pilots and the LRP team leaders was achieved through a series of joint exercises. It was a standard operation procedure that the Sri Lanka Air Force maintained a dedicated rescue fleet of helicopters whenever the LRPs were out on daring missions. LRPs encountered five emergency situations where they either sustained casualty or got cutoff. In all these situations Air Force assistance was sought to save the lives of these men in danger. All five air rescue missions ended successfully.

Reasons for the success of the elite forces could be attributed to many factors. However, good junior leadership and excellence standard of battle discipline are the main factors. They were pure in comparison to any Army in the world. This special gathering should feel and understand how important good junior leadership and battle discipline, apart from battle efficiency are the determines success if things truly supportive. If elite forces start operating in support of the infantry the supported infantry units should have confidence in the elite forces. Similarly the elite forces also should be able to depend on the Infantry. This mutual confidence and inter-dependence was seen throughout the campaign. By conducting well-focused attacks on high value targets in the depth particularly on the LTTE leadership thereby distancing them from the front-line cadres and threatening LTTE's rear. To force them to commit to reserves and extra cadres. To protect the vital places such as airfields and their lines of communication. The elite forces were able to get a strategic advantage for the overall campaign.

Present day war crafting emphasizes so much on the usage of hi-tech to replace human effort. Continuous research and development on such hi-tech equipment are taking place. However, there is a limit that the human scale can be supplemented by technology. Unfortunately, no researches have been done on these issues todate. Elite forces of Sri Lanka relied principally on humans blended with little equipment and technology. Skill and will being the policy due to economic constraints. The fact that the special operation forces achieved these remarkable feats with minimal technology and optimal human scale is admirable and gives it a unique place in the special forces community of the world. The whole sequence of innovative application of military power blending conventional and unconventional concepts designed to defeat the LTTE at its own game paved the way for victory.

The elite forces of the Sri Lanka Army deployed at the sharp end of the strategy took the fight to the depth and safe areas of the LTTE. Their critical assets and finally to the minds of the LTTE. Special operations forces facilitated the military effort and created the condition for the successful outcome of this campaign.

Armoured Corp

Brig Indunil Ranasinghe RWP RSP psc

The Sri Lanka Armoured Corp was at the forefront in all the main operations launched to eradicate terrorism from Sri Lanka. Its contribution at different levels to fight many battles was a cynosure. Armour endured much difficulties to reach thus far. Yet it never resolved to fall back but was appreciated for its effectiveness, commitment and veracity. Armour experience in Sri Lanka accounts for insurrections, counter insurgency operations, limited operations and semi conventional operations.

Sri Lanka being a small country with varying ground conditions made the armoured task more challenging. Getting tank crews familiarised with such a diverse terrain was a huge task. Yet in its unique way armour faced the challenges having considered the indispensability of the combat arm of decisions.

The terrain in the Northern theatre consists of lagoons, coconut and palmyrah cultivations, paddy fields, vegetation, sandy terrain, secondary jungles and built up areas. The aspect to deliberate here is how these terrain conditions became a tactical tool to the enemy and a bottleneck to the Armour. In a limited space in varying ground conditions Armour had to overcome enemy tank hunting parties, ditch cum bunds as well as improvised explosive devices. Armour had to resort to the use of innovative and unconventional methods as well as take calculated risks to maintain momentum.

The ground conditions of the Eastern theatre mainly consist of primary and secondary jungles, built up areas, thick vegetation and marshy lands. The Armour had fewer opportunities to engage the enemy, yet armour provided the deterrence required. Furthermore Armour was used as fire bases and to take on impromptu targets. In the process Armour had to overcome improvised explosive devices and indirect fire from enemy long range weapons.

The threats posed by the LTTE towards Armour; LTTE improvised land mines and used them systematically to cause unprecedented damage often the AFV which got damaged due to such improvised landmines sustained almost a complete kill better known as k-kill in tankers terminology where no was option left other than destroying it completely.

Close country built up areas and the civilian population gave the LTTE a great advantage to close with and engage the AFVs in their vulnerable areas in close proximity. The LTTE very frequently used RPG 7s in numbers and took opportunity targets with shoulder fired and tank weapons as well.

Weapons such as 105mm RCLs , 30mm and 25mm cannons and 12.7mm machines guns posed a threat to light armoured vehicles and their crew. In a number of occasions the LTTE used artillery guns and mortars to counter armour. Moreover the accuracy of the artillery and mortar firing was such that even though it did not damage the AFV it compelled the tank commander to change the position of the AFV or brave the threat to fulfill the mission.

Tasks allocated to Armour in the Sri Lankan battle field were much diverse than other counter insurgency operations. The LTTE possessed few AFVs which were captured from the Sri Lanka Army and the Indian Peace Keeping Force. However many of the improvised vehicles which could sustain fire of infantry weapons posed a considerable threat in terms of using them as suicide vehicles and troop carrying vehicles. Armour was very effective in taking on such targets giving confidence to the infantry soldier. The LTTE effectively took advantage of the natural obstacles and the terrain. Their modus operandi in fighting the Armour in the open terrain was based on long extending ditch cum bunds reinforced with improvised explosive devices, land mines and tactical use of its cadre.

Armour was very unorthodox devoid of all conventional methods of employment to subdue enemy threat. Since the LTTE used indirect weapons on broader front and as the evacuation of casualties became difficult, APCs were used extensively for casualty evacuation under trying conditions when armoured vehicles were not in offensive over other operational commitments.

Armour operations were conducted to negotiate LTTE targets which were difficult for infantry to reach. These Armour operations were conducted targeting heavily fortified bunker lines which helped reduce infantry casualties. Armour was also used for deceptions to divert attention as well as restrict enemy strength.

It is very much prudent to state that the use of Armour in the Sri Lankan context was very unorthodox, mission oriented, less conventional application and was characterised by adaption of new methods to achieve success.

Lessons which could be brought forward are based on these innovative methods used. NBT troops were amalgamated with ICVs, APCs and composite troop entities were formulated. This gave an added advantage of having infantry troops for close protection and where required the NBTs provided covering fire for the lighter AFVs to move with more maneuverability. In areas where fields of fire were less and NBTs could not achieve desired maneuverability, elevated firing positions were made having a ramp to drive the NBT to the firing position over 10-15m above ground. These positions gave good observation and fields of fire especially in static defences.

In the Sri Lankan scenario the LTTE took advantage of the civilian population and their property. Therefore before employing armour assets, the armour commander on ground had to have accurate information of the terrain and the environment.

Use of Armour in close quarters with limited fields of fire and area of maneuver became possible with deliberate preparation and training. Furthermore, here too tank commanders played a vital role since they had to operate independently. AFV crews were multi skilled; AFV commander as well as the crew members could drive and fire with the AFVs. The aspects of mission command were practiced widely. Civilian factor demanded action with responsibility from very junior level. Often the tank formation commander was dismounted and was present at the very location where the action was taking place, to grasp the real situation on ground.

Since tanks were vulnerable due to close ground conditions, innovative ideas were used to improve their protection. They include the use of wire mesh, rubber skirts and sand bags. By wearing hazardous body armour the tank commander was able to operate in the open or with open hatch to maneuver and command the tank minimising the threat of enemy indirect fire, snipers and shoulder fired weapons. Taking up night time offensive defence along threatened areas to strengthen defences after day operations. This was a deviation from conventional armour doctrine but produced very effective results.

Armour support during the final battle for Pudukuduirippu was coordinated at the highest level to avoid blue on blue situation as the formation formed in on the objective. The Sri Lanka Armoured Corp since its inception has done Sri Lanka proud by serving her through thick and thin befitting their motto 'whither the fates call'. Hope not time fades away, the valour of men serving, with those of their brethren from other arms and services.

Artillery

Brig N A P C Napagoda, IG

Artillery has played a crucial role more than ever before and contributed substantially towards the success achieved during the humanitarian operations. The range and the lethality of present day Artillery combined with efficient surveillance and precision target action capabilities enabled application of overwhelming combat power readily and rapidly at critical junctures and at crucial times.

Since most of the operations conducted had to be unconventional to meet the enemy's unorthodoxy, use of artillery too had to be innovative and flexible to cater to the dynamic firepower needs of the field commanders. From the battle of Marvil Aru to the final battle at the Nandikadal lagoon the artillery brigade employed a sufficient number of light field medium guns, MBRL and locative radars in support of fighting formation which facilitated the creation of high gun density over any given area.

By the time the LTTE closed the Marvil Aru sluice gates the fragile ceasefire agreement had already reached a point of no return. At this time only a limited number of fire assets were available to support the operations in the Eastern theatre. The artillery brigade had to build up its artillery fire power as the LTTE pre-planned activities that spread across the entire Eastern theatre within a short time span. Careful management of available guns, the timely forecasting of fire support requirement allowed artillery fire power to support combat operations. Dense vegetation, multidirectional axes, the LTTEs widespread human intelligence and survelliance system made artillery the only weapon that could be made effective owing to the variety of ammunition.

The Artillery brigade played a vital role in the Vanni Humanitarian Operation and was instrumental in achieving all the battlefield victories on which initial encounters in 57 Division in March 2007, up to the final battle at the Nandikadal lagoon. Artillery was able to destroy, neutralise and suppress multi personnel deployment, employment of the LTTE thereby creating favourable ground conditions for the infantry to operate with freedom of movement. Artillery faced severe challenges from the beginning to the end in many aspects. Colonels took these challenges positively, learned lessons, adapted innovative methods and provided accurate and timely fire power as and when required.

Thick jungles, built up areas and marshy land restricted movements of guns and ammunition and deployment itself to a greater degree. In addition, bad weather conditions for months caused constant changes rendering planning with associate technical issues, specific employment of artillery to cater to every situation. Remedial measures that were adapted to overcome the situation specially made gun platforms were arranged by hastily cutting jungles just to facilitate the employment.

Unconventional and unorthodox patterns of layouts were adopted. Guns were deployed having more one centre of fire at times to meet the fire power demands. Centralised recovery teams were organised and centrally located to mitigate problems. Armoured vehicles and tractors were utilised and 120 mm mortar were extensively used in jungles to overcome the terrain restrictions.

Due to the rapid expansion of the Army formations and procurement of new artillery assets in the campaign, artillery had to meet the many requirements with available resources and limited number of recruits. To overcome this problem troops were motivated and ensured the high standard of discipline, developed junior leadership skills, frequent visits by field commanders at all levels, mainly the timely dissemination of information on the successes gained by the fighting formations. On many occasions assistance was obtained from the troops of infantry formations and local protection troops. Recently retired experienced assistant instructors gunnery and technical assistance was recalled for the service. Continuos training programmes were carried out specially for the technical staff. Patrolling was intensified while diffusing the static guards around the gun positions. Utilisation of hostile guns and mortar was a big challenge due to well constructed gun pits, scattered unconventional deployment, single gun or a tube deployment in an area two to three kilometers at times detection of over 50 tubes been observed. Deployment of LTTE artillery and mortar in villages and towns where there was a large civilian population were also observed. Vehicle mounted mortars to extensively use to engage own defences rendering counter bombardment directed at identified targets were ineffective.

These problems were overcome by continuos engagement of the hostile location with a single gun as a remedial action in view of limited available fire units, concentration of effective fire on hostile gun and mortar locations, use of UAVs, beech crafts and launch of patrols to detect hostile gun  positions and bringing down a heavy volume of effective fire on enemy's gun positions with air interdictions.

Despite the risk of being subjected to enemy hostile attacks radars were deployed in forward open areas to detect low trajectory weapons including enemy mortars. Artillery gun positions were attacked by the LTTE continuously, which was a clear indication of the effectiveness of its own fire power against them. Most of the time gun positions were subjected to suicide ground attacks, CB and air attacks. To overcome these problems fire units were divided into smaller segments ensuring the protection of each gun and crew, alternative positions were used and very frequent radio employment was done. Commandos and Special Forces were employed in vulnerable area in the vicinity of gun position to ambush LTTE gun hunting teams.

Troops at times defied conventional accepted practice of the artillery employment in order to achieve better results, whilst scathing the dynamic fire power requirements of the infantry commanders. Some of these measures were firing guns and MBRLs on direct role to support attacking troops column. Coordinating fire support plan, incorporation with infantry, armour and air enabled the augmentation of artillery fire power. To break the overwhelming attacks launched by the enemy on selected localities coupled with deceptions, firstly infantry mortar was used and then armour utilised, and then as a last resort own safety factor was compromised at times in provision of both offensive and defensive artillery fire. Target indicated and requested at any given time out numbered the capabilities due to scarcity of resources. Also acquisitions and correction of fire in the primary jungle was a problem. To overcome this, additional force was employed, well forward with offensive formations by adapting various improvised tactics, techniques and procedures.

Employing senior artillery officers at UAV and Beech craft control stations, UAV down links which were available at headquarters of offensive divisions were extensively used by artillery coordinators to verify and direct concentrated artillery fire with a greater accuracy on high value target.

Collateral damage during the Humanitarian Operations was minimal in comparison with any battle conducted any where in the world. It could be declared as the most important achievement of the artillery, especially with around 300,000 innocent civilians being used as a human shield by the LTTE at all stages of the campaign. The artillery brigade was extremely careful and precise in its fire power missions to minimise damages posed to civilians and their facilities. Measures taken were: no fire zones were introduced with respect to civilian occupied areas, guns were continuously inspected for accuracy by experts, beech crafts and UAV reconnaissance was conducted almost around the clock to verify targets before being engaged and to assure the clearance and safety of civilians. Radars on friendly mode were used to direct own artillery fire which enabled to effectively neutralise targets and minimise collateral damages.

Having endured hard work artillery was bestowed with due honour at the conclusion of the Vanni Humanitarian Operations which also resulted in the total liberation of the country and uniting her under one flag. Today Sri Lanka artillery is well equipped with valuable experience which can be shared with other armies. With conventional type of equipment and least automation Sri Lanka Artillery performed to the highest expectations of field commanders at all times. Careful management of resources, dedication and continuos anticipation of the situations were the key factors in the success achieved.

Engineers

Brig L N Wickramasuriya, RSP USP psc

An accurate assessment of the threat posed by the LTTE and meticulous evaluation of the engineer requirements on the battle field paved the way to formulate an engineer plan to accomplish mobility whilst countering the enemy mobility to provide much needed support for the successful completion of the Humanitarian Operations. Sappers were involved in the early stages of planning and reconnaissance to facilitate the forecast of possible tasks and resources.

 Responding to critical and timely requirements directions were initiated to expand fill in capabilities including the forming of an independent bridging sqaudron. Individual skills of soldiers were developed to face the challenges of operations and in multiple fronts therefore training conducted at the Sri Lanka School of Military Engineering ensured the battle readiness of soldiers to meet the existing threat. Additionally, training of infantry soldiers on assault pioneering task and training of small groups became mandatory to compensate the ever increasing demand for sappers. In order to maintain the simultaneity and tempo in multiple battle fronts across the theatre engineer assets were task organised with manoeuvre formations to maintain forward momentum and ensure routes are opened for follow up tasks and logistic support. The threat by the LTTE in all theatres including the population centres in the southern part of the country was the utilisation of deadly explosives to a maximum possible degree to cause destruction to human life and property.

The mines and IEDs coupled with destructive innovations were among the most effective armour in the LTTE arsenal. Well positioned and strongly fortified LTTE positions were heavily infested with mines and booby traps, which were laid without any pattern and disregarding the law of armed conflict. Basically following a trial and error rule sappers learned fast and promptly innovated counter techniques such as improvised bangalore torpedos to create gaps to attack LTTE defences. The knowledge gained was shared across the theatre including the infantry troops thus compelling the LTTE to change its techniques and patterns of operations frequently. As operations progressed LTTE changed its pattern of operations to the Ditch Cum Bund concept increasing the demand for sappers. DCBs were heavily fortified and heavy concentration of trappings of numerous varieties. When fighting took place in built up areas troops encountered the most deadliest weapon of the LTTE. With a deep understanding of the terrorists' mindset coupled with patience and experience and creative thinking helped sappers equally stand up to the challenges. Lack of roads and tracks for combat service support was a greater challenge to engineers. Earth fill machinery was allocated to manoeuvring formations and mobile repairing teams to improve lines of communications. The bridging squadrons brought down necessary equipments to construct and repair the bridges destroyed by the LTTE. In support of Armour mechanised infantry and artillery sappers constructed elevated fighting positions, gun positions close to the baselines using earth moving machinery at times adopting deception measures to overcome the limitations of mines.

Whilst Humanitarian Operations were in progress bomb disposal teams attached to the field formations in population centres were tirelessly trying to avoid catastrophes posed by LTTE IEDs and suicide bombers. Meanwhile, island wide awareness programmes were conducted for the public in work places, schools and also through the electronic and print media.

Lessons Learned during the Humanitarian Operations. Firstly, learn and adapt. Sappers functioned in a climate of learning organisation across all theatres. Field Commanders firmly stressed on bottom up learning. Ever changing patterns of operations of the LTTE and the knowledge gained in the learning was promptly used to adapt new techniques. Training provided to infantry, assault pioneers and small groups paid dividends and realistic training that greatly increased the efficiency. The next lesson is learn faster than the enemy; rapidly changing situations in the battlefield demanded the sappers to learn faster though the fighting cadres of the LTTE were academically less qualified, their power of innovation was as good as any progressional military force. Hence it was imperative that the sappers were all one step ahead of the enemy to gain the initiative. Another important lesson is to build confidence and promoting mission command. Dynamic and high intensity ambiguous battle environment and simultaneous application of combat power in a wider frontage provided great strength for sub unit commanders to use initiatives while learning and adapting and building self confidence.

The purpose and scope of engineer deployment; requirement of bridging and earth moving equipment was focused in the planning. Minimum maintenance and availability of spares for machines greatly reduced the off load time and forward positioning of spare machines and bridging equipment in pre-designated locations provided uninterrupted supply for the operations. Synchronisation of actions was vital for the success of operations as efficient execution of follow up engineer task insisted on synchronisation of actions across the entire battle front.

The bridging squadron undertook many follow on tasks of erecting replacement bridges across dry and wet gaps, which was created due to terrorist action as allotted engineer groups had already moved ahead with frontline troops.

The continuity of flow of resources; the systematic and uninterrupted flow of men and equipment greatly contributed to sustain the momentum of the operations without a force in offensive timeline thus retaining the initiative. Priority on mobility task was also a very important lesson that was experienced. Planning and allocation of resources had to be precise to keep the momentum of the operations and ensure that the line of communications were kept open to build combat power and logistics without delay. The uninjured offensive posture resulted a less commitment for counter mobility and survivability tasks.

 The importance of human intelligence and imagery intelligence; data and information collected through human intelligence and imagery intelligence became an invaluable forecasting engineering task just facilitating the smooth implementation of the plan.

Providing combat engineer support in a counter insurgency environment demands changing of assumptions regularly. Ability to adapt and mission command, Ground Commanders and troops responded to the need with lots of innovation, commitment and dedication despite a great risk involved and at times under extremely adverse weather conditions. Formulating the combating needed a plan, to counter the threat posed by the LTTE which had a wide spectrum, ranging from an improvised explosive device that violates the law of armed conflict in the battle to a suicide bomber in a busy town was an uphill task.

Signals

Brig K R P Rowel RWP USP psc

The recently concluded Humanitarian Operations witnessed and proved the importance of C4 i-concept where communication was an intregal part of exercising command and control, gathering information and executing missions.

Primary means of communication were radio and CDMA, known as code Division multiple access technology, which was widely used at all levels of command as an alternative. Provision of data communication down to Division level was much effective for higher Commanders to share realtime information for planning. Electronic warfare activities were optimally utilised in controlling electro magnetic spectrum in favour of Security Forces both in communication and none communication aspects. The methods of communication and other facilities provided during the entire Humanitarian Operation; in meeting tactical radio requirements TRC 1077 transferring VHF low band non secure radios and TRM 451 were provided to the infantry company level. In addition to them new equipment such as TRC 9600 VHS low band radio and Assesan VHF high band secure radios were also introduced.

Secure and non secure commercial radios too were used especially in newly liberated areas when conducting clear operations. A VHF high band radio network was established as an early warning system to coordinate the air defence activities. The radio networks of special operation forces were enhanced with HF radios and satellite phones to carry out long range patrols. It was necessary to expand the Army trunk communication systems to establish full duplex communication accessibility from the Army Headquarters to formation headquarters, sometimes with the battalions as well. As the operations progressed the CDMA technology was introduced to meet the increasing Trunk communication requirement. Antennae towers above 100 ft in height were erected with underground communication bunkers to install the equipment. Using this microwave network Commander of the Army and the Field Commanders were provided with the facility to observe live action obtained from the unmanned vehicle by the Sri Lanka Army. GSM facilities were also provided lately utilising the same infrastructure. It was a challenging task to provide electronic warfare ensuring effective control in the electro magnetic spectrum. Maximum possible direction finders were deployed to intersect LTTE radio transmissions and plot the targets. Locally manufactured manpack bomb jammers were utilised to nullify enemy IEDs with remote control features. Remote engagement devices too were manufactured in support of the long range patrol missions.

VHF and UHF jammers were deployed in vital areas to disrupt enemy communication networks. Battlefield surveillance radars and coastal surveillance radars were deployed along the forward defence lines and coastal belts to detect LTTE infiltration, exfiltration and boat movements. Direction finders and radar were also employed on mobile mode to meet any sudden requirement. This was solely dependent on generators as no national grid electricity was available in almost all areas. Hence, additional generators and solar panels were provided to recharge batteries and to function the command and control centres.

It was mandatory to maintain the workability of communication systems using multiple axes all the time. Hence the productivity of field workshops was enhanced with rapid supply of spare parts, accessories and the technical staff. As the operation progressed medium work shops were also introduced at centralised locations to enhance the prepare capabilities.

Various challenges and lessons could be listed in relation to the principles of communication. Deviating from the basic principle of communication was provided even down to two or three levels of command to obtain real time battle picture. Although the integration of communication is very important, high operational tempo limited the accomplishment thus minimising optimum results at times.

Close coordination and battle field awareness on latest situations facilitated re-deployment of signal units in multiple fronts while maintaing the battle tempo. Erection of permanent and semi permanent antennae masts facilitated other formations of service providers to install their equipment on Army towers at the time of need. This was further enhanced with the timely introduction of infrastructure development projects for commercial service providers within the newly liberated areas.

Provision of UAV live feeds to the Army Headquarters and Divisional HQs was very much effective for timely and correct decision making. Issuing dedicated repeaters for battalion command nets facilitated rapid deployment of troops while ensuring uninterrupted and reliable communications at all levels.

Shifting of field workshops from location to location without electricity was a tedious task. At times generators had to be operated inside pits to minimise sound being propagated thus resulting in extensive beating effects.

Provision of CDMA telephone facilities was the key in facilitating Commanders at all levels with considerably secure and interactive full duplex communication. Provision of GSM system minimised the traffic and facilitated the welfare of the soldiers. Timely calibration and simulated accuracy test for direction finding and radar equipment facilitated precise target plotting throughout.

Cannibalising of out of order radios and selective redistribution of available equipment amongst battalions facilitated to meet increasing demands without delay. Commercial telecommunication coverage for the re-settled civilians and state and private sector functioning in newly liberated areas was swiftly provided with the use of Army microwave communication back bone which was developed for the Humanitarian Operations.

Selective deployment of newly introduced radios in a limited geographical area facilitated quick familiarisation and fault rectification. EW activities were mainly restricted to electronic support measures until the enemy was confined into a comparatively smaller geographical area but selective jamming reinforced the counter bombardment efforts as and when required. Rapid sharing of signal intelligence was achieved by interconnecting all directions and finding radar stations with a dedicated radio network using repeaters.

Actions by infantry, armour, artillery and engineers and even services are physically visible and tangible whereas controlling and exploiting the electro magnetic spectrum is hardly visible and the tangibility could only be assessed with special equipment. Although the Humanitarian Operations were over the signalers continue to face the ever increasing challenge of modern technologies including cyber warfare. At this moment Sri Lanka Army is in the process of integrating all systems and within the next few years it may be possible to fully automate them as of other contemporary armies.

Navy

Commodor N Rozairo RSP USP psc MSc (DNSS)

The Sri Lanka Navy fought an asymmetric war and countered the terrorists out at sea. Being a maritime nation with a 679 nautical mile coastline around the country the importance of the sea for Sri Lanka for her survival and way forward needs no emphasis. It is therefore very important to realise how a terrorist organisation like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam used the seas around us to threaten the maritime security, the sea lanes of communication around the island and the freedom of the seas, which was important to local as well as international shipping.

The LTTE was the most ruthless terrorist organisation in the world with a well developed and well tested capabilites in the acts for maritime terrorism. The Sea Tigers, which was the sea arm of the LTTE, had a very well structured command organisation which had its own attack logistic and suicide squadrons and were capable of operations even at high seas. The Sea Tigers also had a merchant fleet, which was engaged in various illegal activities through various front companies based in many capitals around the world.

The Sea Tigers had also carried out a number of terrorist attacks against naval as well as civilian targets, hijacked ships, engaged in large scale gun running, human smuggling, narcotic trafficking and other crimes at sea.

The sea tiger activities could be categorised as launching attacks on naval ships and crafts at sea, launching attacks on merchant ships that were carrying humanitarian cargo to the affected civilians in the North. Hindering the sea lift that was executed to sustain the Security Forces deployed in the North, providing much needed logistic support to the LTTE through sea routes using small boats and large ships, carrying out reconnaissance of harbours and other maritime or coastal installations using the LTTE suicide frogman to infiltrate into harbours and anchorages to carry out under water sabotage, laying mines in tactically important sea areas such as harbour entrances, ferrying injured cadres and reinforcement cadres between coastal locations. In the beginning the sea tigers used fibre glass dinghies with multiple outboard motors and carried small arms for protection and attack. These boats were no match for the high speed and well equipped Sri Lankan Navy craft. Soon the LTTE realised the need to have much bigger and faster craft with mounted guns. With time, the sea tigers developed their craft and was fitted with multiple high power OBMs high as 250 horse power and four such engines coupled together could achieve speeds in excess of 45 knots. These attack crafts were fitted with medium calibre weapons such as 12.7mm, 14.5mm and 23mm twin collar guns and carried an assortment of small arms.

The different types of craft used by the LTTE are attack craft, logistic craft, suicide craft, semi submersible craft, low profile suicide craft, high speed stealth craft and human torpedoes. With no land access to the North of the country, Sea Tiger activities had posed severe threat to the sea lines of communication to the North, particularly with the suicide boats. For most periods of the conflict Security Forces and civilians in the Jaffna peninsula mainly depended on the supplies through the sea to the North. Sea lift of logistics and personal moves mainly from Trincomalee to the North had to proceed with heavy convoy protection to counter Sea Tiger attacks. The Navy had a tremendous task at hand to maintain the sea lines of communication for more than two decades which was the only lifeline to civilians and security forces in the North. The Sri Lanka Navy had been assisting the Governmental and Non Governmental Organisations for a prolonged period to transfer food, essential items, medicine by sea to civilians in the Northern area. These ships were protected against attacks by the LTTE by way of escorting and providing onboard security of the Sri Lanka Navy during the passage to the North.

Even though protected the LTTE succeeded in attacking some of the ships carrying humanitarian cargo to the North. The LTTE attacked these ships with the aim of hindering the flow of aid to civilians in the affected areas and leaving room for the Government to be blamed for not providing sufficient aid to civilians and to tarnish the good image of the Government internationally. The assistance by the Navy continued during the period of the Humanitarian Operations by way of transferring food, medical items, general cargo and personnel by ships from Colombo and Trincomalee to Pudumathalan, Mullivaikkal and KKS. During the final stages of the operations many civilians escaped from the clutches of the LTTE and arrived at Point Pedro and Pulmoddai by boats. These civilians were assisted ashore by Navy personnel and the required were provided with first aid.

Towards the latter part of the conflict the sea tigers used to launch about 50 sea tiger crafts and another eight to ten suicide crafts in one cluster, often mingling with the fishermen to attack Sri Lankan Navy formations. The Black Sea Tiger suicide boats had to be identified and destroyed swiftly as given time they would attack in a pack of five to six in one attempt to overwhelm the Navy craft. The suicide boats were having a very low profile moving at 35-40 knots with armour protected bow and were extremely difficult to detect and engage.

In dealing with the LTTE's wolf pack attack the Navy understood that it had to drastically innovate to counter this threat posed by the sea tigers as it had destroyed some of the naval ships and crafts through this tactic. In response a formidable fire power was provided on both fast attack crafts with better day and night senses. Also in 2007, a new wing of the Navy was commissioned which consisted of a very large number of very high speed small attack crafts known as the rapid action boat squadron who fight alongside the special boat squadron, which already existed in the Navy.

The LTTE's capability launched 25 to 30 attack and suicide craft at one go which were soon confronted with the Navy being able to launch 60-70 small attack craft of the special boat squadron and rapid action boat squadron along with the fast attack craft deployed at all strategic locations, and were engaged in combats successfully negating the asymmetric nature of the LTTE warfare.

The Navy was able to deny the seas to LTTE illegal activities and also prevented the LTTE cadres and their leadership from escaping through the sea route from Mullaitivu during the final phase of the Humanitarian Operations through an effective naval blockade. The LTTE terrorist campaign totally depended on the Arms and Ammunition brought into the country through the sea route from various countries. Towards 2006 the LTTE was using fishing trawlers to transfer war like materials from their ships known as floating warehouses that were stationed far away from the coast of Sri Lanka. The Navy had no doubt that it was of utmost impor tance and priority to deny the sea routes to the LTTE to obtain their supplies and weapons for their terror campaign.

Through good intelligence the Navy monitored the movements and the locations of the LTTE ships that were loaded with Military hardware. Due to the importance of the consignment of cargo and value to the LTTE they ensured to position their ships more than 1,000 nautical miles away from Sri Lanka.

As the ships were out of reach of the Sri Lanka Navy, the fleet had to improvise to a large extent and take calculated risks to proceed that far out to sea to locate these ships.

The Navy destroyed eight LTTE ships during the period of 2006-2007, at the beginning of the Humanitarian Operations. The first ship was destroyed September 17, 2006, around 350 nautical miles south east of Sri Lanka. The second ship was destroyed south of Sri Lanka 730Km away from our coastline on February 18, 2007. The third and fourth ships were destroyed on March 18, 2007, 1,650Km away from the Sri Lankan coast. Three ships were destroyed between September 10 and 11 2007 at a distance of 2,800 Km away from the coast of Sri Lanka. The final ship was destroyed on October 7, 2007 3,440 Km south east of Sri Lanka.

If all the war like material on these ships were transferred ashore it would have had a great negative impact on the Humanitarian Operation. Also, if the sea tigers had remained in existence, they would have threatened the international sea lines of communication of Sri Lanka creating a more dangerous situation to that of the Somalian pirates.

Disruption of these ships ensured that the Navy had cut off the supply route of the LTTE completely which was the pivoting point that aided the Sri Lanka Army to further their objectives on land and finally succeed in the accomplishment of the Humanitarian Operations.

Air Force

Air Vice Marshal K A Gunatilake, VSV
 

Sri Lanka Airforce played a vital role in the three decade long battle against terrorism culminating in carrying out operations in both classic and supporting roles in the Humanitarian Operation. The key in the success of the Humanitarian Operation conducted by the Armed Forces of Sri Lanka was the outstanding leadership and commitment provided at all levels. This was true of the political leadership starting from His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka, Secretary of Defence, to the military leadership from the Service Commanders right down to the Field Commanders. They endured the pressures of the diplomatic, political and military arenas with precise objectives to guide the troops. This effort produced strategies, tactics, leadership, moral and motivation which enabled a result unmatched in the history of conflict.

The Sri Lanka Air Force utilised its limited resources to optimum effect using its hard gained experience of a three decade long battle against terrorism to conduct a successful counter surface force campaign to deprive the LTTE of the military power it needed to occupy territory or exploit sea space. The Air Force conducted counter-air operations to achieve and maintain the necessary control of the air to give us a favorable air situation to carry out air operations in support of ground and naval forces. Combat support operations were conducted to provide necessary essentials to enhance the capabilities, functions, and tasks of Sri Lankan ground and naval forces.

The Sri Lanka Air Force carried out very successful and precise air interdictions. A strict evaluation process and clear rules of engagement were adopted with the aim of meeting a key objective that of zero collateral damage. One of the main reasons for the success of such operations was accurate and most up to date intelligence. The Air Force shared a database with the directorate of military intelligence. The Air Force adopted its own procedure of updating and verifying this intelligence using UAVs and real time imagery to thier advantage. Effective target to weapon matching and selection of delivery platforms was carried out, which focused on proportionality not only to be effective but also to ensure zero collateral damage.

The use of Precision Guided Munitions further enabled the achievement of this aim. Surveillance aircraft were utilised over the target during acquisition and carried out battle damage assessment in real time to evaluate the results. This also enabled to effectively counter LTTE false propaganda on collateral damage. The Air Force employed its surveillance assets to continuously monitor the battlefield. Proficient analysis and constant communication with the Field Commanders added to the success. This also enabled the Air Force to engage many targets which had a direct and immediate influence on the battle. Targets selected were analysed using live imagery with further confirmation from Field Commanders. All target engagements were closely monitored by specialised officers and battle damage assessment carried out immediately after the attack.

The SLAF employed Air Liaison Officers at divisional level for effective coordination. Closed air support was thus provided with current and accurate intelligence and confirmation from UAVs. The SLAF used MI 24 helicopters as the main close air support role platform, and also used MIG 24s for low level deliveries in the closed air support roles. MI 24 helicopters were deployed in very close proximity to the battlefield to react quickly to ground force requirements maintaining the element of surprise on the enemy. Close air support pilots were updated with real time imagery, which enhanced the accuracy of missions. Continuous maritime and coastal surveillance was conducted and shared intelligence with the Navy. The Air Force maintained direct communication with Navy Headquarters as well as Eastern and Northern naval commands. This enabled the Air Force to engage a large number of LTTE maritime assets. Here again the Air Force used munitions and carefully selected delivery platforms which gave excellent results. Through effective and reliable communication, coordination and positive attitude the Air Force responded to all naval requirements very quickly. ISR assets were deployed extensively and effectively covering the theatre as well as the coast and sea. Probably the most innovative and effective system adopted by the Air Force was the battle management concept. Real time video downloading was facilitated from UAVs and surveillance aircraft, which were provided to all relevant agencies. His Excellency the President, the Secretary Defence, Army and Navy Commanders and their operation centres, fighter attack squadrons and battlefield Commanders were all provided live imagery of the battle field and beyond. All intelligence agencies were linked to the battle management centre and specialised teams carried out real time image analysis. All air activity was centrally controlled through this centre which enabled the missions to be carried out with accurate target verifications and battle damage assessments. It was also pertinent to mention that during the last stages of the operation the rescue of the trapped civilians was conducted where real time images of what was taking place were shown.

Air transport provided a main form of communication to the Northern peninsula which was cut off from the rest of the country. Air Force transport and utility helicopters were positioned in close proximity to the battlefield allowing a quick reaction at the hour of need. The Air Force carried out casualty evacuation and rescue operations 24/7 and also carried out special helliborne operations with the Sri Lanka Army, which provided a key element of surprise. Armed escort for naval convoys throughout the operations were provided and at no stage of a conflict did the LTTE force an air-to-air threat. However, they were equipped with surface to air missiles and anti aircraft artillery. A number of missions were carried out to destroy enemy air defence capabilities to gain a favourable air situation. The Air Force also deployed air defence assets to protect VTs and VAS.

The task would have been impossible if not for the training provided for SLAF aircrew. Training was provided in forward looking infra red, night vision goggles and laser guided munitions; training was given to pilots to give them confidence in low level flying and were trained for special night missions and were also focused on joint missions with the Sri Lanka Army and the Sri Lanka Navy for synergy.

The pilots of the Air Force responded to the hour of need magnificently. They undertook missions with courage commitment and dedication to prove beyond doubt that it was not the machine and the equipment but the man behind the machines that made the difference.

The Air Force succeeded in achieving and maintaining an intelligence advantage over the enemy. Therefore, the conduct of air based offensive operations against identified centres of gravity was successful with no collateral damage. It was an effective force multiplier for the sister services to align for multiple and parallel operations.

A strict evaluation process and rules of engagement, the provision of real time imagery to enhance intelligence and situational awareness, and training that improved the skill level of the air crew enabled the Sri Lanka Air Force to successfully provide the required support to land forces. With these operations, the Air Force was able to join its sister services to liberate the motherland from the clutches of terrorism and bring about an era of peace after almost 30 years of conflict.